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Deregulating the Second Republic
Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett*
"The milestones into headstones change," penned James Russell
Lowell' in the years immediately following Wabash Railway Co. v.
Illinois2 and the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.' Indeed,
as the nation marks the diamond jubilee of the Communications Act of
1934, interested fiduciaries have collated their wit, wise musings, and
substantive concerns into one compact issue of this Journal.Successors will
probably categorize our scratchings as "milestones," "headstones," or-at
a minimum-a slim volume noting the general consternation of the bar,
bench, and academy sixty years into a statutory regime.
But as brevity need not substitute for rigor, the Author proposes the
following questions for analysis:
(1)
Given the recent calls for a redrafting of the Communications
Act of 1934, has the time arrived to review the means by
which we regulate the National Information Infrastructure

(NII) and,
(2)

-if soWhat procedures should be addressed in implementing such
a review?4

* Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission. B.A., M.A. Loyola University
of Chicago; J.D. DePaul University College of Law. The Author has served on the Federal
Communications Commission since September 8, 1989. The Author is a member of the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), a member of the
NARUC Executive Committee, its Committee on Communications, and a former Chairman
of its Committee on Water. Prior to 1989, the Author served as Commissioner of the Illinois
Commerce Commission and as president of the Mid-America Regulatory Conference
(MARC). The Commissioner thanks Indiana's Dan Meyer, his former research assistant, for
his invaluable research, legal analysis, and careful draftsmanship. His partnership brought
fresh ideas and insights to a rather old debate.
1. JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, Sixty-eighth Birthday, in POETICAL WORKS OF JAMES
RUSSELL LOWELL 433, 433 (Cambridge ed. 1980).
2. Wabash Railway, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
3. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
4. This Essay advocates a legislative response to the challenges facing the deregulation
of the telecommunications industry. The Author presumes that the 104th Congress will take
up the issue of information law reform in either the first or second session. For an
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The goal of any redrafting of the Communications Act of 1934 should
be to incorporate the intent of Congress.' Clear, specific, and narrow
standards are necessary as a matter of prediction and process.' In the
alternative, unclear standards shift political discourse from the floors of
Congress to fax machines and ex parte contacts during the small hours
prior to the sunshine period.7 Review of the legislative mandate underlying
the Communications Act of 1934 could begin with extensive oversight
hearings by the congressional committees assigned jurisdiction over
technology, communications, and information law. From such hearings, a
consensus on the changing character of the market may emerge and
reactions to those changes may present themselves in the form of bills to
amend the Communications Act of 1934. But to legislate those changes
into the ratio legis of the statute, regulatory change as an act of governance-andnot politics-requires "clear text" underlying the legislative
mandate.' Rational, ordered regulation is not served by discerning
legislative intent or purpose from various, intermediate points of the

alternative, judicial-centered approach, see ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
IN A GLOBAL ERA (1992).
5. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43,
reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984). Lawyers assuming a regulatory paradigm based on
Article I of the U.S. Constitution must presume, implicitly or explicitly, a deliberative
model. As core curriculum in legal education teaches only a common adjudicatorymodel,
common discourse becomes problematic in law review writings. Article III is no longer the
primary source of regulation it was in the nineteenth century. Indeed, given the political
question doctrine, the legislature may be the only forum for reform. See Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1987) (emphasizing the charge to the court of appeals to
"seek a reasonable reading" of statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities).
6. Lawrence Friedman, On Regulation and Legal Process, in REGULATORY POLICY
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 111, 112 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985) ("Presumably, form can also
change the affect of the rule.").
7. For an early description of this problem, see the Beelar-Dirksen exchange on the
floor of the Senate in 1959. ProposedAdministrative ProcedureReform: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 86th
Cong., Ist Sess. iv-429 (1959); Charlotte P. Murphy, Legislative Interest in Administrative
ProcedureDuring the 86th Congress, 12 ADMIN. L. BULL. 132-36 (1959).
8. By narrowing the definition of standards, the Author refers to the academic tradition
covering statutory construction and legislative drafting. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (a rather ambitious proposal for the introduction
of common law methodology into statutory interpretation); REED DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING (1954); ERNST FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION, A STUDY OF THE WAYS AND
MEANS OF WRITTEN LAW §§ 27, 46, 51, 56 (1932); ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF

AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1965). For an effort to develop a "language of statutes" parallel
in strength and utility to the "language of the case," see WILLIAM D. POPKN, MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION, POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1993).
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deliberative process.' Discourse must lead to disciplined drafting and the
language of that drafting becomes the standard defining the legislative
mandate of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission).
Approached as a matter of process and not as analysis of the
procedural transcript, rational and ordered regulation may provide the
means by which we address the fundamental changes confronting
deregulated telecommunications. Indeed, the premises under which we
labour may now lack empirical justification. Regulatory slack water-the
point at which independent, incompatible actions by financial markets and
the Commission destroy what both the regulator and markets strive to
create-awaits the decision maker who dismisses the connections between
(1) deregulation, (2) the endorsement of competition as the juridical
principle underlying that public policy, and (3) the ability to create a
nationwide information infrastructure. Absent public finance, private
investment is necessary to expand American telecommunications into an
information "superhighway." The availability of private capital for national
infrastructure is predicated on a predictable rate of retum-the level of risk
fixing the cost of the financing-as determined by the American, or indeed,
global financial community. An accelerated rate of technological change,'0
a constitutional regime" granting wide discretion to independent agencies,
and the vacillation of public policy between the goals of "deregulation" and
"reregulation" are three factors lending uncertainty to the capital markets. 2 These three phenomena converge to constrain capital-the less

9. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated a reluctance to rely on legislative history
in construing unambiguous statutes. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied sub nom., Connecticut v. FCC, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
10. This is not always the exclusive realm of the private sector. See Carl Weinschenk,
Long Time Coming, CABLE WORLD, May 23, 1990, at 90; Flat Screens, Crystal Diplomacy,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 1994, at 70. But see Edward Baig, The Incredible Shrinking Dish,
Bus. WK., May 30, 1994, at 143; Infrastructure in the Sky, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1994, at
101.
11. The Second Republic is a direct reference to the framework established by Theodore
J. Lowi in his analysis of the New Deal, the Supreme Court's reaction to that national
initiative, and the consequences of the congressional delegation of power that occurred after
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). For the roots of
administrative discretion see ROBERT CALLIS, SEWERS (1647) (discussing the constitutionality of the delegation to royal engineers under Y.B. 8 Hen. 5 (1519)). For context, see
MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY 7-11 (1990). For Lowi's current
characterization, see THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM; THE SECOND REPUBLIC
OF THE UNITED STATES 271-310 (2d ed. 1979).
12. The nexus between investment and regulatory uncertainty must be addressed in the
wider context of regulation's effect within firm theory. See Roger G. Noll & Bruce Owen,
The PoliticalEconomy ofDeregulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION
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capital available, the more limited the vision of tomorrow's "superhighway"
available to both regulators and policymakers. And the connection between
certainty and our regulatory structure is all the more important because the
end product must serve both the American consumer and an American
industry racing to preserve its comparative advantage against international
competitors.13
Acknowledging administrative jurisprudence's increasing complexity,
the Court deferred to agency competence in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 4 The title of this Essay references the Second Republic critiqued by Theodore J. Lowi, whose analysis
of Schecter reached its apotheosis in Chevron. The Court foreclosed the
judiciary's last substantive ties to what was once a judicial power-economic regulation. 5 But this alleged juridical flight from regulation
is deceiving. Indeed, the time has come for American governance to

32-40 (Roger G. Noll & Bruce Owen eds., 1983). For a related view, compare generally,
Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations:The Regulation of Telecommunications in an Era
of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39 (1993); Dial "R"for Risk, ECONOMIST, June 4, 1994,
at 84; Making a Meal of Mergers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1994, at 87. Such uncertainty may
be derivative of the legislative mandate or the regulatory process. See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN,
THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 727 (1941) (discussing planning in the
agency context); Multimediators,ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 1 (discussing the regulator's
current dilemma); Taking the Scenic Route, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 67 (discussing
regulatory constraints on the information superhighway).
13. See Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1263 (1993). Japan has predicted a "superhighway" connecting
the island with ten years. The international market has quickened with North American
developments. Cf Gail Edmondson, Wireless Terriers, Bus. WK., May 23, 1994, at 117;
Europe's Would-be Champions, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1994, at 60; Singapore:Not another
Boom, ECONOMIST, June 18, 1994. And, indeed, it is refreshing to see American business
acumen rebound abroad. See The Race to Wire the World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May
23, 1994, at 18; Where is the Consumer in Consumer Electronics?,ECONOMIST, Sept. 24,
1994, at 65, 65 ("The world's consumer electronics makers have one last chance to protect
themselves before America's revitalized computer industry grabs the burgeoning
'infotainment' market for itself.").
14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984). The
current Court may be returning to more a traditional economic rights doctrine. See Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994).
15. Colin S. Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin AdministrativeLaw, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393, 428-34 (1981). The character of nineteenth century law and its role in fostering the
industrial revolution is still the subject of significant debate. For the purposes of this Essay,
the Author assumes that a combination of common law reasoning-Karl Llewellyn's "Grand
Tradition"-and its promotion of economy fostered the financing of national infrastructure.
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 71-108 (1967);
STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION, THE CHARLES RIVER

BRIDGE CASE 165-71 (1971); ELIZABETH BRAND MONROE, THE WHEELING BRIDGE CASE
3-19, 163-78 (1992).
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address the question of whether the Commission, and its peers, have
evolved into complex decision-making bodies not unlike Article III courts.
Though lawyers-traditionally proponents of a legal culture centered on
Article III of the United States Constitution-were confined to the limits
of Schecter and Chevron 's narrow adjudicatorymodel, the same profession
has developed new deliberativeskills to meet challenges unique to the legal
landscape or the regulatory palatinate of Article I. As such, collegial Article
III-type decision making is conducted by agencies wielding powers
previously reserved to both Articles I and III. However, the transformation
of independent agencies into true prudential, collegial, Article III decisionmaking bodies has not been accepted as the scholarly model or as the
professional model explaining the Commission's legislative mandate. 6 For
agencies to function as collegial decision-making bodies, they must receive
the legislative mandate in a statute employing rigorous categorization and
precise language-that is, clear text.
In my fourteen years, I have concluded that the regulatory state's fine
line between law and politics is fiber thin. This transfer of an interpretive
legal power-wielded masterfully by Article III judges in the early
nineteenth century-to federal agencies with nascent institutional decisionmaking conventions and fledgling empirical skills has been followed by yet
*another destabilizing period. After the transfer of the regulatory power, we
as a nation have been unable to articulate public expectations of the
independent agency.' 7 As such, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary,
and the American public have varied and conflicting expectations of the
Commission's role in the administrative state. This lack of a relevant

16. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS-A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 111-15
(1981); Paul Verkuil, The Purposesand Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
257, 260; Rate-Making-A Judicial, Legislative, or Ministerial Function?, 9 COLUM. L.
REV. 341 (1909). Accepting the Article III model entails a parallel acceptance of the limits
imposed by both prudence and candor. See generally Scott C. Idleman, A PrudentialTheory
of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1995) (a rigorous, insightful, and
thorough survey of judicial candor in Article III fora).
17. Professor Friedman questions the efficiency imparted by common law reasoning.
The division between his position and that of Judge Richard Posner, may, in a limited sense,
be evidence of a categorical split. If there is a difference between litigation addressing
private rights and economic regulation, then Friedman's case study-the transformation of
the fellow-servant principle-may be different in form and substance from the macro-issues
presented by market structure and deregulation, Compare Friedman, supra note 6, at 129
and Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA.
L. REV. 451, 451-61 (1974) with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
440 (4th ed. 1992) and Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335, 335-51
(1974) andGeorge L. Priest, The Common Law Processand the Selection ofEfficient Rules,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65-82 (1977) and Paul H. Thebaine, Why is the Common Law
Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51-63 (1977).
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mandate should be a primary concern of any redrafting of the Communications Act of 1934.
Noting the need for predictability and reckonability in the ordering of
national commerce,'" there are three points within the administrative
structure of the Second Republic from which predictability can be drawn.
Of least impact is the decision-making process employed by each
Commissioner. But to the extent that regulators can employ a consistent
and ordered decision-making process-perhaps by recourse to theories with
public choice or public value foundations-the overall process may become
predictable. 9 The next most important source of predictability is the
rulemaking of the Commission. Here the assumptions and formulae
underlying rulemaking are all-important, and so is the use of standards
within the rules themselves. Not unlike the use of narrow, specific
standards within agency rulemaking, full delegation from Congress in the
enabling statute is the greatest source of certainty at law. But full
delegation must be executed with rigorous, narrow, specific standards in the
legislative mandate of the statute itself
The Supreme Court has held "that laws [must] give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning... [I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them."2 The needs of the consumer, small business, and big industry are
parallel to the ordinary person. Moving from a regulated to a deregulated

18. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS 17-18, 215

(1960).
19. Languages of law and economics-as common law reasoning or the Socratic,
dialectic method-are the regulator's tools. As the legal academy no longer promotes a
common, unified professional language, less intellectual comity may exist between future
lawyers. See Friedman, supra note 6, at 115. Assumptions and language will become more
suspect as intellectual diversity promotes variation instead of the doctrinal scholarship
formally fostering uniformity. But economics is still useful in promoting competition. See
Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 201, 202-17
(1978); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975)
(frameworks relevant to the current mandate). Given alternative mandates, other languages
may enter the public discourse. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Communications Policy Making,
Competition, and the Public Interest: The New Dialogue, 68 IND. L.J. 665 (1993)
(employing a "new dialogue" through an "endless policy loop"). Contra Richard H. Pildes
& Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990). As one applies
professional languages to statutory texts, that choice itself excludes certain options. See
Theodore J. Lowi, The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study, 86
AMER. POL. ScI. REV. 1 (1992).

20. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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industry entails some market turbulence. The concern should be over
whether that turbulence is a factor of the transition or of the rules and
statutes prompting that transition.2 Born of a legal regime based in
delegation of powers (to independent agencies), and evincing broad, general
mandates (in the form of legislative standards), the Communications Act
of 1934 was emergency legislation rescuing a sector of the American
economy from general market failure.' The independent agency created by
the Act, the Federal Communications Commission, shares this background
consideration with other agencies of the same era-the Federal Power
Commission (FPC), the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the United States Maritime
Commission, and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Only one agency-the National Bituminous Coal Commission-was later abolished.
Others found subsequent roles in the governing paradigm established by
Schecter.
But a bureaucracy capable of making such transitions can not rewrite
the law itself. And it is axiomatic that a tool fashioned for one chore
performs a subsequent task with structural difficulty. Indeed, much of
criticism directed at the FCC in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, was issued
by those noting this fundamental premise.' The Commission founded to
order radio chaos and to act in lieu of the antitrust laws with respect to the
emerging telephony monopoly, has spent much of the intervening sixty
years deciphering what the legislature wants it to do as the underlying
market has changed. Concurrently the Commission tried to manufacture the
tools required to complete its original legislative mandate.24 Indeed, the

21. In addressing the former, Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
litigated as Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(holding the one-house legislative veto provision of § 202(c) unconstitutional).
22. See generallyROBERT BRITT HoRwiTz, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM 12223 (1989). Lowi notes Schecter's impact on congressional autonomy (Article I powers) and
teaches that the process of delegation without clear, precise, mandates is "legiscide."
Arguably, the same model-perhaps a form of 'Yuriscide"--has been employed in reverse
to Article III courts. See Lowi, supra note 11, at 273-77. Compare Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
23. A list of the more important criticisms includes WALTER GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS (1956); FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION

OF LIBERTY (1960); Ronald H. Coase, The Economics of Broadcastingand Public Policy,
56 AMER. ECON. REV. 440 (1966); Louis L. Jaffee, The Independent Agency--A New
Scapegoat, 65 YALE L.J. 1068 (1956).
24. In this aeneid, it has been aided by the publishing bar and the academy. The trade
and general press have assisted as well. Economist has published four sturdy surveys over
the past year which give a general view of the market changes affecting our industry. See
Feelingfor the Future, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 1994, at 5 (television); The Mathematics of
Markets, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at 3 (finance); Saw it on the Radio, ECONOMIST, Oct.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

Commission has begun to see itself as an independent agency of an older
Progressive tradition, which focuses on the means by which infrastructure,
and not mere economic sectors, is regulated."
Anniversary issues are known for dire predictions and fantastic
visions. There will be those cheering, or lamenting, the end of regulation
as we know it. Such may be the case, but absent the extension of Schecter
to limit the reach of the regulatory state or the return of congressional
government asserting the same, one is forced to address the Second
Republic on its own terms. If we are to meet the challenge of the changing
global economy, then our course must be within the current administrative
state's analytic framework. Common ground can be found in two
theoretical areas: (1) the organization of agencies has varied over
time-perhaps as a function of the activity regulated-and (2) the
specificity of congressional, legislative mandates has weakened. As an
ailing industry in the 1930s, telecommunications was subjected to
regulation by an agency guided with abstract, universal, discretionary, and
proscriptive legislative standards.26 A statute orienting the Commission
toward a role in regulating national information networks and servers-and
not an ailing,pre-InformationAge industry--would be drafted more along
the lines of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 which sought to regulate
underlying infrastructure.27 Accordingly, a redrafted Communications Act
of 1996 requires concrete, specific, rule-bound, and proscriptive standards.
This approach calls for precise language and rigorous categorization-it
calls for clear text. Categorization is not easy. Is a newspaper on-line still
"print," is it a broadcast, or is it something else? Is "network" an applicable
category in the post-cable broadcast industry? These are categorical
problems implicit with technical change. The legislative mandate of any
law reform must match the categorization to both the structure of the
market and the underlying purpose of the statute itself; this coupling of
categorization and market structure with drafting-when accompanied by

23, 1993, at 18 (telecommunications); and The Third Age, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1994, at
3 (computer industry).
25. See HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 10 (1988). Defining agencies established prior to
1916 as institutions to formulate general rules for structural sectors of the economy,
Horwitz labelled the Commission's initial purpose as asserting price-and-entry controls for
the protection of key industries in the 1930s. Id.
26. LOWI, supra note 11, at 98-99.
27. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Though superficially modeled on railroad
precedent, communications law drafters in 1934 could not draw on the same rich state
regulatory tradition to classify and define statutory lexicon. Unlike radio technologies,
switch, engine, and rail were "mature" technologies by the time they were regulated.
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'precise nomenclature-supports a textualist methodology respectful of the
legislative mandate. Only by meeting these two criterion will Congress
ensure that the new delegation of power to the Commission conveys, in
Lowi's words, "the full ambit of authority" to the Commission.28
Given the lawyerly, shared tradition of elusive, malleable reasoning
at the common law, the use of narrow standards to foster predictability and
certainty may seem counterintuitive.2 9 Indeed, the flexibility of common
law reasoning has entered our discourse through legislating drafting with
nomenclature like "common carrier" and "universal service" (which began
life as market hype coined by Theodore Vail in his promotion of the new
National Bell Telephone Company in 1880 and is now being applied in the
common law tradition to subsequent forms of technology).3" And even
when the issue of vagueness is tried in an Article III court of law, such
review is performed under an adjudicatory model tailored, post-Schecter,
to the needs of private rights litigation and not necessarily for the needs of
economic regulation.3' Accepting the private rights paradigm for the
adjudicatory model does not mean that paradigm meets the needs of the
deliberative model. Post-Chevron, the Supreme Court has partially blocked
Article III as a source of standards. Absent the grant of such authority to
the Commission sua sponte, Congress must guide the independent agency
by means of standards explicit to the statutory mandate. And though there
is a pronounced shadow land where adjudication addresses both private
rights and economic regulation,32 the dichotomy between regulation and

28. LoWi, supra note 11, at 96. Such a quid pro quo, mutual consideration between
Congress and independent agencies, requires federal officials to respect the autonomy of
Article I, perhaps through textual interpretations of statutes. See POPKIN, supra note 8, at
336, 354-64 (general survey of the textualist approach).
29. LLEWELLYN, supra note 18, at 17-18.
30. KENNETH GOIRDON & JOHN R. HARING, OFFICE OF PLANS & POLICY, FEDERAL
CoMMUNICATIoNs COMMISSION, THE EFFECTS OF HIGHER TELEPHONE PRICES ON
UNIVERSAL SERVICE 2 (Working Paper No. 10, 1984); JARICE HANSON, CONNECTIONS:
TECHNOLOGIES OF COMMUNICATIONS 57-87 (1994) (discussing Vail's promotions); see

Rogers v. Head, 79 Eng. Rep. 226 (K.B. 1611); Rich v. Kneeland, 79 Eng. Rep. 282 (K.B.
1613) (for the derivation of "common carrier").
31. Broadly worded statutes precluding predictability are clarified by a narrow
interpretation defeating future charges of vagueness. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S.
489, 497 (1982); see also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966). Vagueness
becomes a problem when a statute "does not give fair warning of the proscribed conduct
or if it is an unrestricted delegation of power that enables enforcement officials to act
arbitrarily and with unchecked discretion." Keeffe v. Library of Congress, 777 F.2d 1573,
1581 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But see Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (undue delegation doctrine used a canon of statutory interpretation).
32. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 464 (1983) (holding that the SEC's narrow
construction-that simple neglect or nonfeasance under the Securities Investor Protection
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nonregulation is only theoretically problematic. In daily matters, the lines
are clearer. Fostering a superhighway is economic regulation; ALJ
proceedings with respect to licensing are adjudication over some bundle of
private rights.33
Legislative standards, certainty, predictability, and reckonability can
collide in unassuming statements. An example of uncertainty and
unreckonability was recently offered by my respected colleague of fourteen
years Delano Lewis, Co-Chairman of the National Information Infrastructure (NII) Advisory Council and president of National Public Radio (NPR).
During an interview discussing the need to address universal service in the
drafting phase of law reform, Lewis's position was paraphrased:
Whether or not the council weighs in on pending telecommunications
legislation, the group's real impact and influence could be felt once
policymakers begin to implement new measures, if they pass.34
By implicitly avoiding the legislative process and implying an interpretive
function post-drafting, Mr. Lewis inadvertently placed the NIIAC in the
position of the Federal Communications Commission, an independent
agency with both Article I and Article III powers. Add NIIAC "to the
mix," and Article II joins the process. While this is the norm in other
countries, it may contravene American rule of law. To the extent Lewis
sees the council as a body to advise Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown,
these remarks are benign and the spirit of the council beneficial. But as the
article's subject was the future of universal access-a policy goal defined
in an Act and through a legislative mandate to the Commission-Mr. Lewis
seems to imply the NIIAC would engage in ex parte proceedings after the
Congress completed its legislative mandate to the Commission. This is
public administration by fax machine and a most pernicious source of
uncertainty. It would be better to lobby Congress as an executive
Act § 14(b)-was not void for vagueness).
33. But even the Court's very necessary focus on individual rights brings uncertainty
to economic regulation. Juridical principles used to review social regulation-when used by
lawyers in regulatory discourse-impart destabilizing uncertainty and contravene the
tradition of progressive, economic, early nineteenth century jurisprudence. As such, a
juridical fora which once imparted certainty and predictability to economic affairs now

imparts uncertainty to the same.

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM

13-36

(1982); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REv. 547, 552-60 (1979). The need for more
specificity in administrative standards was argued by HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962).
34. Jeffery Silva, Universal Access Turning Out to Be Very Thorny Issue, RADIO
COMM. REP., May 9, 1994, at 10, 10 (emphasis added). See also Hearings on H.R. 3626
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 144-47, 182-86 (1994) (statements of Reed E. Hundt and
Larry Irving).
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department-under Article II-and to establish one's thoughts in the
statute's clear text. To do otherwise is contrawise to Article I of the
Constitution." Under Schecter, complete delegations with narrow
standards reviewable only by Article III courts and Article I oversight
hearings isolate economic regulation from the intense political pressures
surrounding social regulation.
Why is this a market impediment? When describing the classical
model of appellate pleading and adjudication, Karl N. Llewellyn wrote a
telling excursus on predictability and reckonability as values of traditional
jurisprudence. 6 The law ought to be predictable so as to allow the citizen
to order his or her affairs. Contradict this simple maxim-as one could
argue has been the norm under the Second Republic-and one citizen is
left confused as to the state of the law. Allow this contradiction industrywide and whole markets will be impeded. Capital is not released from Wall
Street; joint venture ships are cancelled; emerging technologies are
deferred. Predictability at regulatory law is not only critical, it is largely
ignored by the social, rights-based jurisprudence taught in law schools and
practiced in the nonregulatory realm.37

35. See generally U.S. CONST. arL I, § 1, cl. 1; § 7, cl. 2; § 8, cl. 18. Mr. Lewis does

describe the "endless policy loop" cited by Cate, supra note 19, at 666-69. Though this
process-based argument satisfies the academic need for characterization, Professor Cate may
have overlooked some structural issues. See Cate, supra note 19, at 675-77. Compare Lowi,
supra note 11, at 92-97. Ultimately, even such "policy without law" must meet the broad
confines of Schecter and Chevron.
36.
Our institution of law-government would be highly satisfactory, as a human
device, if at this stage it could commonly offer, on the scale of 'certainty' of
outcome, a reckonability equivalent to that of a good business risk. Surely... we
should be able to hope for that level of reckonability by the time one reaches the
[appellate stage].
See LLEWELLYN, supra note 18, at 18. Here agencies parallel appellate courts; indeed, the
Federal Communications Commission is often the springboard of litigation bound for Article
m fora.
37. In Aman and Mayton's Administrative Law, the conventional wisdom is presented
as, "once admitted, as it must be, that some delegation is proper, these matters, of precision
in language and important social values, come down to matters of degree, and not matters
of principle. The judge has to understafid whether a delegation is of a primary social choice
(and not a more trivial matter best committed to administrative routine) and whether the
terms of the delegation are not too open-ended." ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T.
MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW31 (1993) (emphasis in original). This does not discount
social choices, but underscores that a system oriented toward social choice theory may not
consider the economic soundness of those choices. Social choice theory may leave fallow
whole areas of analysis. Even within these circles, the current academic regime is engaged
in a contentious debate. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DiscouRsE 76-170 (1991); PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH 91-

118 (1992).
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If the role of telecommunications in our economy has shifted from
one of many economic sectors to one of a fundamental, structural
foundation of the entire economy, then Congress may need to revisit the
role of telecommunications regulation. As with the hearings on airline
deregulation by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in the 1970s, such
a congressional effort should begin with hearings designed to investigate
the changes in the economy and to suggest ways of redrafting the
Communications Act of 1934 to meet those changes. The preparations for
redrafting should be comprehensive in scope and, in order to garner the
best analysis in the country, should be organized twelve to eighteen months
in advance to allow for public and private institutions to compile their
studies.
Such hearings could consider many alternatives to the current scheme
of regulation. Predictability would be fostered by drafting
concrete, specific,
38
rule-bound, and proscriptive legislative standards that:
1.
Incorporate specific FCC doctrines compatible with the
emerging market."
2.
Substitute words of narrow breadth for those currently used
of wider breadth.4"
- and 3.
Are the product of rational, articulated competition theory
(and subsequent technical classification) reinforcing congressional economic or social choices."

38. LOwI, supra note 11, at 98-99.
39. As for the delegation of power with a sua sponte mandate, such delegation may
invoke constitutional concerns. The question would be whether the legislative mandate, in
the spirit of Chevron, would be within even the wide ambit of Schecter. What is now the
Schecter-Chevron pale was first discussed in James Wallace Bryan, ConstitutionalAspects
of the Senatorial Debate on the Rate Bill, 41 AMER. L. REV. 801, 811 (1907) (Pay
particular attention to the author's counterattack on the legal arguments present on the floor
of the Senate by Joseph B. Foraker (R-Ohio) on February 28, 1907.).
40. POPKIN, supra note 8, at 353. Such drafting could look to Commonwealth v.
Massini, 188 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) and Central Television Serv., Inc. v. Isaacs,
189 N.E.2d. 333 (11. 1963) for initial guidance on statutory interpretation while narrowing
to terminology to meet the needs of the superhighway. For instance, the statutory role of
"universal service" may be moribund. See HANSON, supra note 30, at 69. In its inquiry, the
legislature may wish to define the term in light of technological change by determining how
it interacts with the goal of greater competition and the fiscal requirements of the National
Information Infrastructure (NII) initiative. Such a definition may involve public choice
analysis. Alternatively, public value theorists would point to some overarching ratio legis.
See, e.g., CARL L. BECKER, MODERN DEMOCRACY 11-12 (9th ed. 1952) (connecting the
daily workings of communications lawyers to larger movements).
41. The role of such a theory must be to provide the Commission with the very
benchmark, the "Golden Rule" of statutory interpretation provided Article III judges. Green
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co. 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (discussing the application of the
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Sea-changes are tense periods for policymakers; they are merely the
lawyer's landscape. Storms from Lake Michigan, the Midwest's great
inland sea, sweep Chicago each winter. Cayuga's waters chum every spring
and autumn, wrapping upstate New York's pebbled shores in thick fog and
still water. What is important for the regulator is not the fury of the seachange. It is the conditions below, in the lakes' silent depths. Like
Washington lawyers, lakeland mariners have tools with which to order
change. For regulators, the most important tool is to know the limits of
one's craft. Where do Schecter and Chevron end? They end where
questions of popular will begin. Competition theory-as a legal, not an
economic doctrine-is in need of definition and the legislature must
provide the forum. Not only has the market changed, but Washington itself
is now focused on the central question of who we are as an American
people. And as the American people have been wind-blown by post-war
demographics, the global economy, and the Cold War's surrender, so now
their public servants are buffeted by a parallel sea-change. Such fundamental queries affect all areas of governance and they are too important to be
left to unrepresentative fora.42
No market is a fixed structure and markets trading securities, stocks,
bonds and credit in advanced technologies are most apt to change. As the
market changes, so must the mandate from Congress. To do this, Congress
should probably revisit the statute-with a comprehensive review-more
than once every six decades. In addition to the cart load of policy papers,
think-tank treatises, newsletters, and blurred facsimiles that will cross
congressional desks during this legislative reform, two monographs written
at the beginning of the "commission movement" may hold a message for
those grappling with change. When Henry Bru6re, Director of the Bureau
of Municipal Research, City of New York, reviewed that municipality's

"Golden Rule" to the Federal Rules of Evidence). Congress may want to do some
substantive fact-finding before it drafts the standards underlying the Commission's future
mandate. The Commission recently utilized this fact-finding to establish auction criteria for
PCS spectrum. John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 147, 151-60
(1994); Revenge of the Nerds, ECONOMIST, July 23, 1994, at 70.
42. BECKER, supra note 40, at 65-100. For the legal foundations of competition theory,
see JOEL DIRIAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR COMP==TON: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST POLICY (1954); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:

PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1988). But greater questions loom. Perhaps the silent depths
are better reflected by public philosophical debate. Compare GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992) with ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM & BOURGEOIS RADICALISM (1990). Wood cites Carl Becker in a polemic-,that has
recently come to Washington by way of the heartland. For a summary, see Gordon S.
Wood, Hell FirePolitics, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 1985, at 29; KRAMNICK, supra,
at 1-40, 261-95.
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initial foray into regulation, he noted that independent agencies were the
cautious solution to a problem attracting more crazed arguments for state
ownership. Reform was cautious, deliberative and thoughtful. A half
century before, America's first regulator wrote two review articles on the
growing problems presented by the clash of interests surrounding railroad
rate regulation. Stating that chaos was the state of the nineteenth century
deliberative model, he reminded American intellectuals, "The most
important material interests of the American people are deserving of better
care than an honest confession of ignorance."43
The force of change may require a sunset provision in the redraft of
the Communications Act of 1934; this would bring the Congress back to
the three core criteria every five to six years. Examining these three criteria
periodically will bring to regulation Llewellyn's "Grand Tradition" of The
Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals." Though Chevron and
Schecter have pulled Article III out of regulation, the common law tradition
provides a model for congressional drafters sharpening their wits and
pencils for law reform. And we should not find it odd that a treatise
describing the certainty and reckonability of the appellate process holds a
certain light to the legislative and regulatory dialectic, for "the better and
best law is to be built on and out of what the past can offer; the quest
consists in a constant reexamination and reworking of a heritage, that the
heritage may yield not only solidarity but comfort for the new day and for
the morrow."45

43. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., RailroadInflation, 107 NORTH AMER. REv. 130, 164
(1869); Henry Brurre, Public Utilitiesin New York, 31 ANN. AMER. ACAD. 535, 535 (1908).
44. LLEWELLYN, supra note 18.
45. Id. at 37-38 (this section provides a discussion of the means by which an
adjudicatory model produces certainty and reckonability; it remains for the current
communications law bar to provide a similar model for the deliberative fora). As for James
Russell Lowell, the entire text was penned, "As life runs on, the road grows strange; With
faces new, and near the end; The milestones into headstones change; 'Neath everyone a
friend." LOWELL, supra note 1, at 433.

